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INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper is a case study in public policy, specifi-
cally a study of the patent policy of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Many government funded scientific
research projects spawn patentable inventions, and it is the
task of public policy to determine in whom the oatent rights
to these inventions vest. The patent policy question reflects
a larger issue, one which concerns how the fruits of "govern-
ment science" are, and ought to be, divided among its ootential
beneficiaries.
Our country is becoming increasingly deoendent on science
and technology for prosperity and national security, so much
so that the government is now the most important natron of
scientific research.^- Knowledge, especially scientific know-
ledge, seems destined to become the primary source of wealth
and power in the future if it is not already that now. Thus
it seems important to ask how public policy regarding scien-
tific output is made, who shall control such output, and what
steps are being taken to insure that research results are made
available to the widest possible range of users. Certainly,
artificial limitations on effective technology transfer such
as may stem from legal technicalities would not seem to make
sense from a scientific, economic, or political ooint of view.
^Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron ,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) , op. 14-2 8.
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i'lany activities of crucial importance to the national
interest have been effected over the last few decades through
arrangements of government-industry cooperation. For a vari-
ety of reasons a blurring of the boundary line between the
public and private sector was not viewed as a matter of great
concern. Government patent policy constitutes a good exarrmle
of this blurring effect: that most inventions arising from
publicly funded research are given away primarily to govern-
ment contractors seems to be officially regarded as a matter
of convenience. But now a more active concern for the output
of government science appears to be warranted, and this paper
will examine the current state of public policy in this area -
specifically with a view to discovering whether patent policy
fits more or less into an incrementalist or comprehensivist
mold
.
Source material for this thesis covers a number of
fields and takes a variety of forms. The controversy over
government patent policy is not a new one, and several exten-
sive studies of it have been carried out under government
auspices. This paper utilizes two recent studies, one which
covers the patent policy of NASA specifically, and another
which covers research activities of all government agencies
and the problem as a whole. A large number of articles per-
taining to government patent policy can be found in law re-
views and they constituted a good source of information.
Another class of books and articles covering "technology
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transfer" was consulted, and a NASA sponsored study of space
program spinoff is particularly utilized. Other areas which
the source material covers are: government science policy in
general, the space program, and the patent system. Also, sev-
eral papers pertaining to technology transfer and government
science in Great Britain and Hjurope were utilized in this re-
search. The writings of spokesmen for incrementalist and com-
prehensivist approaches to policy making were likewise examined,
and their arguments will be dealt with presently.
The patent policy issue has, over the years, mainly fo-
cussed on one simple issue: should patent rights to inventions
arising from government sponsored research be claimed by the
government, or should they, as a matter of government policy,
be allowed to vest in private corporations? But if the issue
is simple, the solution is not, for while it is normal busi-
ness procedure for the backers of research to claim patent
rights as a legitimate return on their investment, the govern-
ment clearly does not possess the same attributes as a private
business; it cannot be a marketer of spinoff unless it decides
to become involved in the manufacturing business. Some stu-
dents of the problem argue that the patents should be in the
public domain, while their opponents reply that this would
nullify the usefulness of the exclusive patent right as an
incentive for marketing an invention. The complexity of the
problem is apparent: not only are the public’s rights involved,
but also there is the question of how best to achieve technology
u
transfer. For example, effective technology transfer would
insure that advances in space research such as improved meth-
ods of handling very cold liquids are made known to potential
civilian users like manufacturers of truck refrigeration sys-
tems .
But before those issues just mentioned can be examined,
an equally difficult and complex problem must be taken ud,
one in which the idea of ’’the public’s rights” seems to be
challenged. Questions about the existence of a definable
’’public interest” and about the influence of private pressure
groups on public policy currently fill the air, it seems,
whenever particular government policies are scrutinized. It
can be argued that government patent policy is unduly influ-
enced by private special interests, and that a definite lack
of public policy exists in the area of spinoff arising from
government research. The patchwork of practices concerning
spinoff which does exist could be said to be traceable to
the influence of government contractors, who are intimately
involved in the government’s science program. On the other
hand, it could be argued that interest groups are an inevit-
able presence and serve a useful purpose. There is one school
of thought which holds that private pressure group influence
over policy making is both natural and legitimate and serves
to make government responsive to political demand. This posi-
tion has been called ’’incrementalist” and its adherents ’’inter-
est group liberals.” There is another school of thought which
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argues that the government should pursue policies which are
impartial and in "the public interest;" this is the position
held by the "comprehensivists . " It would be tempting to por-
tray the dispute between the incrementalists and the compre-
hensivists in black and white terms, but in actuality there
are gray areas between the two sides, and their spokesmen
themselves are somewhat wary of speaking in absolutes. Also,
as will be pointed out later, their arguments do not make up
all that can be said on the subject of public policy forma-
tion. Nevertheless, the incrementalist/comprehensivist dis-
pute is extremely helpful in clarifying the patent policy
problem. Tne arguments of both sides will now be presented.
Six main points of disagreement can be discerned in
this controversy. The first and perhaps most important one
concerns the complexity of modern government and its impli-
cations for policy-making. From the incrementalist point
of view, the best way to achieve understanding is to break
off fragments of reality and subject them to scrutiny. The
incrementalist policy-maker makes use of certain strategies
and dodges to avoid taking on a problem as a whole because
he is in a "universe that he is wise enough to know is too
big for him." 2 It follows that changes in government programs
should take the form of small rather than big steps. Such a
^Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. , 196$ ) , p". 27.
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piecemeal approach is also held desirable because it is said
to enhance political stability. The incrementalists are skep-
tical of "unbiased'' analyses of political and governmental
problems; they feel that neutrality is very difficult to achieve
but that the "partisan analysis" of government policy problems
done by interest groups is useful because it is usually focussed
on a narrow area. As long as one bears in mind the partiality
of the analysis, it can be helpful. Comprehensive prescrip-
tions for remedying government problems are distrusted by the
incrementalists because they seem to contain seeds of author-
itarianism. Finally, such comprehensive prescriptions are
made in pursuit of the "public interest," and as Charles E.
Lindblom argues in his book The Policy Making Process : "Clear-
ly there is no general agreement on what constitutes the pub-
lic interest.
Comprehensivists also focus much attention on the com-
plexity of government and its problems, but they feel that
such complexity calls for greater, not lesser efforts aimed
at ordering governmental activities. Theodore Lowi writes
in his book The End of Liberalism : "The fact of the matter
seems to be that the immense complexity of development and
control in the industrial society are too powerful for thought-
less institutions."^- Comprehensivists criticize the incrementalist
3 Ibid . , p. 17.
^Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism , (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc . , 1969 ) , P^ 27
.
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approach because they feel that it leads to the granting of
special favors to pressure groups. Since the comprehensiv-
ists believe that centralized policy making can work, such
special favors are felt to be basically unfair. It could be
argued that the variance between the views of the incremen-
talists and the comprehensivists is linked to their differing
political perceptions regarding government power. While the
incrementalists seem to fear centralized government as being
prone to repression, comprehensivists fear a hegemony of soe-
cial interests over government. This type of fundamental dis-
agreement cannot be resolved here, but the examination of NASA’
patent policy which comes later should give some indication of
how appropriate each of these theoretical positions is when
confronted with a specific policy problem.
It can be said at this point that comprehensivists would
probably interpret the fragmentation of current government
patent policy as an example of how interest group influence
prevents government from being effective at solving its prob-
lems. Incrementalists, the comprehensivists would argue, do
not give sufficient credence to the power of interest groups
to erode, rather than to contribute to public policy. Such
power should be subject to a certain amount of restraint in
the public interest, and comprehensivists feel that it is
government’s role to administer restraints where necessary
if the public interest is involved. When interest group in-
fluence is the deciding factor in certain areas of public
policy, then, as Theodore Lowi argues, there exists ’’a crisis
s
of public authority-' which will not be resolved until public
authority is restored. A relevant question to ask at this
point could be whether or not present patent policy, or the
technological matters to which it applies, are of such a com-
plex nature that any changes in patent policy must only take
place in small steps. Hopefully, the analysis contained in
Parts Two and Three provides some answers to this question.
Incrementalists accept interest group influence as be-
ing a healthy aspect of the political process because they
feel a "balance of power" exists between interest groups.
The existence of such a balance of power constitutes the sec-
ond main point of contention between the two camos. Since the
incrementalists believe in the balance of power it follows that
they do not fear that any single interest can Dossess unchecked
dominion over certain areas of public policy. Aaron Wildavsky,
in his book The Politics of the Budgetary Process says that the
federal budget amounts to "a web of social as well as legal re-
lationships in which commitments are made by all the narties,
and where sanctions may be invoked (though not necessarily equal-
ly) by all. "5 He also writes that "no one group of men . . .
can necessarily impose their preferences uDon others within
the American political system. "6 The interest group liberals,
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process .
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964
) , p^ 37
6 Ibid., p. 131.
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it could be said, seem to see in the great diversity of inter-
est groups a kind of natural system of self-adjustment and
checks and balances. Lindblom writes "The play of power in
policy making is not as rough, harsh, violent and bloody, even
in authoritarian states, as might be suooosed."? Lindblom
seems to be saying that the balance of rower plays a role in
many different types of political systems and perhaes consti-
tutes a natural element of politics everywhere.
The comprehensivist side replies that the notion of a
balance of power in politics constitutes a rather idealized
picture of reality, and that such balance of rower which does
exist is by no means perfect. Theodore Lowi notes that a
strong similarity exists between the nineteenth century idea
of automatic society" self-regulated by various laisse
z
faire
mechanisms and the interest group liberal postures of today.
He writes that an "obvious feature of pluralist reasoning is
that with pluralism society remains automatic." "Pluralist
equilibrium is really the public interest."^ Just as cacital-
ism stressed that economic competition was an adequate means
of social control, interest group liberals argue that com-
petition between groups is sufficient in sunolying its own
controls for the public interest.
7






Comprehensivists feel that the idea of an "invisible
hand" guiding economics and politics has been discredited
by experience. They believe that social controls sometimes
need to be consciously spoiled, and that such application
should take the form of explicit public policies consciously
applied and enforced through vigorous administration. "Ra-
tionality applied to social control is administration. "9
Lowi argues that many modern interest grouts do not balance
each other off because of their specialization, which leads
to interest group power that is oligarchic rather than com-
petitive
.
Incrementalists acknowledge that groups often do not
so much compete as cooperate: when groups disagree there is
a tendency for them to search for some common ground of agree-
ment, and such a search can lead to new and unanticipated ways
of solving certain problems. Comprehensivists reply that such
"mutual accommodation" still does not fundamentally alter the
power of interest groups over some areas of policy making.
Again we see a basic difference in political perceDtion between
the two camps: both sides witness the same phenomenon but draw
different conclusions from it according to their attitudes to-
wards public and private power. In terms of patent Dolicy,
this point of disagreement concerning balance of power between
interest groups should lead us to inquire into the nature and
9lbid . , p. 27.
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make-up of patent policy interest groups. We should also ask
if these interest groups do, in fact, serve to check and bal-
ance one another.
The third major point of disagreement between incremen-
talists and comprehensivists is closely related to the balance
of power concept: interest group liberals believe that the
interplay between groups proceeds according to certain "rules
of the game" which work to give each interest group at least
some satisfaction of its desires. Thus laws imposed by gov-
ernment can be viewed as unnecessary in many cases since rela-
tionships between groups seem civilized and self-regulating.
This argument would seem to be nullified if, in the realm of
patent policy, there were no countervailing interest groups
or other elements of society with which to have give-and-take.
Nevertheless, interest group liberals seem generally distrust-
ful of controls on groups imposed from the outside. Wildavsky
writes: "Coordination is often just another word for coer-




The incrementalist understanding of the word "rule"
seems somewhat more encompassing than a strict dictionary
definition, which states that a rule is "a prescribed guide
for conduct." 11 Lindblom cites as an example of a "rule"
10Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process , o. 153.
11Webster t s Collegiate Dictionary , Fifth Edition, 1%6,
p. 871.
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that the wishes of the public at large cannot be completely
ignored by any leader, no matter how powerful he may be. 12
It could be argued that "constraint" is a more accurate word
to use than "rule" for this situation, but since incremental-
ists seem to feel that the political process is capable of
generating certain apparently universal constraints on policy
makers, it can be understood why they use the word "rule."
In other words, incrementalists seem to believe that compet-
ing interest groups will interact in a generally predictable
way, and that part of this interaction is made up of a set
of predictable "rules of the game." To incrementalists, these
preordained "rules" seem to be just as binding as rules or
laws consciously enacted. Again we see that much of the con-
flict between incrementalists and comorehensivists is based
on their differences in political perception, which seems in
some cases to elevate the importance of semantics.
The comprehensivist camp feels that adherence to infor-
mal rules which are often not consciously devised is no sub-
stitute for law and due process. Lowi writes: "Consideration
of the justice in or achieved by an action cannot be made
unless a deliberate and conscious attempt was made by the
actor to derive the action from a general rule or moral prin-
ciple governing such a class of acts." 1 ^ Comprehensivists
1
2
Lindblom, Policy Making Process , p. UU.
13
^Lowi, End of Liberalism , p. 290.
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argue that public policy formation cannot be left to processes
which time and again seem to lead to the granting of special
favors to certain groups. Grant McConnell, author of Private
Power and American Democracy
, points out that voluntary asso-
ciations constitute a major element of America’s social and
economic make-up, and that they have always been loci of jeal-
ously guarded private power. The notion of ’’self-help” has
always militated against the ’’interference” of lawmakers in
the affairs of private associations. McConnell writes: ”In
comments made by AFL leaders on the law and the courts was
an implicit dislike for the very idea of law, and not merely
for the law that touched labor. Freedom seems almost de-
fined by the interest group liberals as a mere absence of
government regulations, says McConnell.
The comprehensivists contend that special interests
certainly ought to be subject to some control over what they
do where it affects the public interest. It could be argued
that in programs where ’’cooperation” between government and
elements of the private sector takes place, such as in gov-
ernment science, laws relating to the nature of that ’’coop-
eration” should be promulgated. Lowi argues that use of law
makes governmental planning much easier, allows the actions
of government to be judged according to clear standards, and
-^Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy ,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. $2.
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enhances democratic forms. It should be noted that the patent
policy controversy is largely a legal one; thus the appropri-
ateness of pluralist informality in this area seems question-
able. The task of science policy formation as a whole could
be said to require that conscious decisions be made relating
research projects to one another and to overall goals so that
government science can be most effective. Comprehensivists
argue that law is well suited to help provide these standards
and goals.
The incrementalists would reply to the comprehensivists’
desire to set goals with the argument that interest groups
are a vehicle of expression of public wants and opinions.
Thus in a sense interest groups do help set goals, or at least
indicate which ones are politically feasible. The represen-
tativeness of interest groups constitutes the fourth main
point of controversy between the two camps. Lindblom views
the role of the interest group as being largely educative
rather than as being pressure oriented . He explains that
much interest group activity is devoted to explaining policy
issues to the membership. The membership, in turn, is able
to transmit to the group leaders its "informed" opinions and
desires. Interest group liberals believe that the communica-
tions function of interest groups is one form of their demo-
cratic nature. They also believe that with enough hard work
•^Lindblom, Policy-Making Process , p. 62.
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almost any group in society can become effective at getting
its voice heard.
The comprehensivist reply to the argument that interest
groups are democratic stresses that some interest and commun-
ity minorities are systematically excluded from having a voice
in public affairs. This results, as McConnell says, from the
way constituency is structured. He argues that private asso-
ciations, especially ones with very narrow purpose, tend to
adhere to the "iron law of oligarchy" by which the internal
structure of an organization becomes very autocratic. Inter-
est groups generally tend to want to present to the world an
image of solidarity, and this is especially easy for special
purpose interest groups with rather homogeneous memberships.
McConnell points out that if certain interest groups do not
have countervailing interest groups to limit their rower, the
issue of internal democracy becomes crucial. McConnell does
not feel that the tight-knit, informally organized interest
groups which seem to be reminiscent of "town meeting democracy"
are really that at all: "There is a direct connection between
size of the community, degree of formality of relationships,
and ease or difficulty of enforcing patterns of subordination. "16
McConnell recalls Madison’s point in F ederalist #10 that big-
ness of a country can be a virtue in so far as controlling the
"schemes of oppression" of factions is concerned.
•^McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy ,
p. 107.
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Not only does minority expression tend to be excluded
from many interest groups internally, it seems also clear that
many classes of people, such as, for example, consumers, are
not well suited to being organized into an interest grout?.
Thus comprehensivists do not want to rely exclusively on inter-
est groups to express public opinion and determine policy in
the public interest. Whether or not patent policy can be
thought of as being democratically formulated, or is in some
sense the product of the public’s desires, is a question which
this disagreement over the ’’representativeness” of interest
groups presses upon us. In other words, we may ask, what is
the nature of patent policy’s "constituency”? This question
will be dealt with in Parts Two and Three.
A fifth point of dispute between incrementalists and
comprehensivists concerns the separation of government from
the private sector. The interest group liberal seems to
feel that a blurring of the boundary line between the Dublic
and private sectors is not a great problem. Indeed, interest
group interaction with political administration is seen as
the essence of politics; thus interest group influence on
government is seen as legitimate and even desirable because
it ostensibly keeps the government responsive. Such pheno-
mena as the "dollar a year man” recruited from private indus-
try to advise the government, and "regulatory” agencies which
seem captured by the parties supposedly regulated perhaps
would appear to violate the pluralist’s laissez faire beliefs
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regarding government involvement in the affairs of private
associations. But the basis for this seeming inconsistency
lies in the way interest group liberals perceive the polit-
ical process: as was noted before, it is government power
which seems most feared by the incrementalists; on the other
hand, interest group power is not feared.
It could be argued that the dividing line between the
public and private sectors is particularly blurred in the
realm of government science, with professional people and
executives frequently crossing back and forth between govern-
ment posts and private employment. It should not be surpris-
ing, then, to find that science policy in certain areas seems
greatly influenced by private interests. Amatai Etzioni, for
example, has called the Apollo Program a "moondoggle" because
it has made work for hundreds of aerospace companies when our
science dollar perhaps could have been more productively spent
on other areas such as oceanography, although these areas have
less special interest clout. It seems necessary that soecific
areas of policy, such as patent policy, be examined in order




not surprisingly, argue that lines
of governmental authority should always be kept clear. This,
of course, also serves to keep the boundary between public and
private clear. The comprehensivists express great concern over
the power of special interests, saying that power is power no
IS
matter who exercises it. They feel that the authority and
legitimacy of the government is in doubt when special inter-
ests seem to be forming policy in the name of the United States.
The comprehensivist definition of nolitics apoears to be more
precise than the incrementalist's in the sense that it insists
on judging the actions of government as government. Lowi
writes. "Despite what social science may say, nolitics is
morality. Politics is the making of choices between good and
bad, choices of priorities among competing good things. "1?
Lowi makes just the opposite interpretation of interest group
influence on policy than the incrementalists make: instead of
being the ultimate expression of politics, interest group
influence represents, according to a central tenet of nlural-
ism, 'a discontinuity between that which is socioeconomic
and that which is political. The informality of government
industry "cooperation" is really a symptom of the demise of
politics: "The fusion of capitalism and Dluralism," says
Lowi, "was a success; destruction of the Drinciple of separate
government was its secret. "-*-9
Part of the patent policy question involves the basic
fairness to the taxpayer and to non-contractor businesses
l^Lowi, End of Liberalism
, p. 231.
•^ Ibid . , p. 45.
-^ibid . , p. 54.
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of awarding patent rights free of charge to companies doing
research for the government. It perhaps could be argued that
interest group liberalism does not make room for questions of
the justice of certain government policies after pressure grouo
interaction has played itself out and the policy has become
fixed. The extent to which present patent policy represents
a blurring of the boundary line between the public and private
sectors, and whether or not this blurring is healthy and/or
necessary are questions with which later sections of this re-
port will deal.
Ihe sixth point of disagreement between incrementalists
and comprehensivists is a somewhat academic one: incremental-
ists seem to claim that their analysis of policy making is
basically neutral and value free, while comprehensivists, of
course, dispute this. Lindblora suggests that since Dolicy
makers are pretty much limited by the complexity of the tasks
facing them, interest in the process of policy making, rather
than the power of interest groups, is more warranted. In other
words, it seems to be easy for an incrementalist to think of
himself as being neutral about values. It is no accident that
Lindblora titles his book The Policy Making Process , and Wildav-
sky titles his book The Politics of the Budgetary Process .
In both works the authors draw extensively on studies of how
policy is made, that is to say, the mechanics of the process,
by describing all the particular strategies and dodges employed
by government officials involved in policy formation. This
20
myriad of maneuvers convinces the incrementalists that "policv
problems simply run beyond his [the official's] analytical com-
petence By a kind of osmosis the incrementalism which seems
forced upon policy makers is adopted by its students. In an
ironic turnabout, the incrementalists seem to claim for them-
selves the analytical neutrality which they strongly argue is
almost impossible for policy makers to achieve. The interest
group liberals apparently do not choose to make judgments on
policy per se
;
they seem to accent the outcome of group inter-
action as part of the "art of the possible."
The comprehensivists say that interest grouo liberalism
is by no means value free and that it amounts mainly to an
apology for the status qu£. The comprehensivists cite the
apparent ideological inconsistency of incrementalists regard-
ing interest group involvement in government as an indication
of tne opportunism and basically self-serving nature of inter-
est groups. Unlike the incrementalists, the comprehensivists
are very much concerned with who makes policy, and they see
the ostensibly value free interest group liberals making value
laden prescriptions when they argue against governmental con-
trols on interest groups. The incrementalist emphasis on pro-
cess, the comprehensivists argue, leads only to a misleading
and artificial paradigm of the political process. Comprehen-




conservative bias. There is, of course, nothin? wrong with
being conservative except that it tends to erode the incremen-
talists apparent claim of neutrality. Lindblom admits to a
certain conservative bias in incrementalism in the sense that
it reflects people’s preferences and cannot run ahead of them.
Gomprehensivists would go further and charge that there is too
close an association between special interests and wealth, and
that this connection often militates against Drogressive soc-
ial programs which would tend to spread affluence more evenly
in the population.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two
camps is that while the incrementalists seem largely to accent
the status quo in politics the comprehensivists see great dan-
ger in this. Lowi lists "four counts against interest grouD
liberalism as a corruptor of democratic government”: first,
interest group liberalism works to confuse expectations about
democratic institutions; second, government is rendered impo-
tent by catering to interest groups: ’’Delegation of power
has become alienation of public domain - the gift of sover-
eignty to private satrapies." 2 -^ Third, interest grouo liber-
alism demoralizes government by preventing it from achieving
justice; and fourth, democratic government is corrupted be-
cause its forms are evaded by interest grouo liberalism,
21Lowi, End of Liberalism , p. 239.
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which results in great public cynicism towards government.
In each case interest group liberalism could be said to prevent
the government from acting as government, and thus we are
brought back to the initial division between the two camps,
that over government power.
Whether or not this dispute over government power is
eventually resolved, the fact seems to remain that certain
policies of the government still need to be subjected to crit-
ical examination. Francis E. Rourke
,
in his book Bureaucra cv .
politics, and Public Policy does not seem to be stalled over
the question of government power. For Rourke, both incremen-
talist and comprehensivist positions have some merit because
he feels that government actions should be both responsive
and effective, if possible. There is, however, a crucial ele-
ment in modern bureaucracy which challenges incrementalist and
comprehensivist alike, and that is the presence and need for
expertise in administrative activities. As was mentioned be-
fore, expertise plays a particularly significant role in sci-
ence policy. It could be argued that expertise lies outside
the realm of group process, but at the same time expertise
cannot be ignored by the comprehensivist who would emphasize
the value of administrative hierarchy. Rourke points out that
hierarchy can be a source of arbitrariness and irrationality
in the face of correct expertise. Nevertheless, experts need
to be under some form of influence or control. "If politics
is a source of bureaucratic power, so too is knowledge," says
23
Rourke. 22 "Professionalism is rapidly succeeding politics as
the principal source of decentralization of authority in Amer-
ican bureaucracy. A subordinate who is master of esoteric
skills is no easier to dominate than one backed up by a strong-
ly entrenched group of political supporters.” 2 ^
Rourke lists several possible ways to integrate the ex-
pert into our governmental system of checks and balances. One
suggestion is to create semi-autonomous "super boards" which
could bring to bear on policy problems both specialized know-
ledge and a broad view of the public interest. Another sugges-
tion involves trying to bring into government people whose edu-
cation prompts them as administrators to be more responsive to
the public interest; "Then the problem of controlling bureau-
cratic power is very largely solved at the source" says Rourke. 2^
A third possible way of controlling bureaucrats is to create
new agencies to circumvent deeply entrenched bases of oower.
It is notable that Rourke does not in an a priori fashion ex-
clude either incrementalist or comprehensivist approaches:
"Incremental and comprehensive ways of looking at policy issues
need not always be mutually exclusive .
"
2 5 Thus we seem impelled
22Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public
Policy , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company
, 1969)
,
2 -^ Ibid .
, p. 105 •





to examine policy problems individually and to try ascertain
solutions appropriate to them. The study of NASA's patent
policy which follows will strive to do this without trying
to make judgments on the usefulness of either incrementalism
or comprehensivism in areas other than patent policy.
PART II
NASA'S PATENT POLICIES AND SPACE PROGRAM SPINOFF
CHAPTER I
PRESENT PATENT POLICY AND ITS LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1953 estab-
lished a civilian space agency (NASA) whose primary purpose
is to carry on space activities which are ’’devoted to peace-
ful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” 1 Aside from
activities which promote the public good on a project by pro-
ject basis, such as launching weather and earth resources
satellites, there exists another important area in which space
science is meant to promote the public good, that is, through
the transfer to the civilian sector of "space age” technology.
NASA has emphasized such space program "fallout” as biomedical
sensors and a tough inorganic paint as examples of how money
spent on the space program is actually of most benefit "down
here on earth.”
NASA’s technology transfer operations are basically
oriented towards use of the patent system. NASA’s Assistant
General Counsel for Patent Matters heads a division which
implements the patent policy established for NASA by Section
305 of the 195^ NASA Act, while NASA’s Office of Technology
Utilization tries to interest private industry in space
1National Aeronautics and Space Act , U.S. Code,
Vol . XL1I, sec. 2L51 (1958).
27
program technology by offering royalty-free licenses to NASA
patents and also by operating information dissemination pro-
grams. No attempt is made by these divisions to recover the
government’s research and development investment. While NASA’s
technology transfer activities are quite advanced in comparison
to other government agencies, this has not secured NASA from
criticism; on the contrary both private industry and those
concerned about the "giveaway’’ aspects of technology transfer
have censured NASA, although for differing reasons. The fact
that NASA in some instances retains title to inventions aris-
ing from its research and licenses them, while in other in-
stances allows its contractors to take title, could be inter-
preted as showing a lack of overall policy concerning space
program spinoff. Indeed, the patent organization’s activities
sometimes conflict with those of the Office of Technology Util-
ization when the rights to a certain invention are in doubt.
The space agency’s seeming confusion of practices regarding
technology transfer is not surprising, however, when one rec-
ognizes that innovation itself is not well understood, and
that even our patent system, which is as old as the Reoublic,
has been a center of controversy since its inception.
The results of a Denver Research Institute study have
added more fuel to the technology transfer disputes by indi-
cating that the major economic impact of space research does
not take the form of discrete inventions but consists of gen-
eral advances in technology which defy quantification, and
2 #
are hard to attribute to the space program alone. Such issues
as whether or not the government should claim the rights to
its research inventions, and how much control, if any, it should
exert over the fruits of its science programs are at the heart
of the patent policy dispute, but also apply to the problem of
technology transfer as a whole. An examination of NASA's pat-
ent policies should indicate the present state of government
action regarding this problem, since NASA's technology transfer
activities could well serve as a prototype for many other gov-
ernment agencies.
Section 305 of the NASA Act of 195# ostensibly deals
with NASA’s "Property Rights in Inventions" which arise from
its contract research projects. Unfortunately, the Section
fails to indicate whether the government should generally
claim title to patentable inventions (this is called "title
policy
) ,
or whether the contractors should be allowed in most
cases to reserve exclusive patent rights to inventions (this
is called "license policy," i.e. the government is automatic-
ally allowed to hold licenses, but not exclusive patent rights,
to inventions arising from NASA funded contracts). Section 305
came about as a result of industry and Patent Bar unhappiness
with the original NASA patent policy, which legislative records
show was to be patterned after that of the Atomic Energv Com-
mission. The AEC’s patent policy requires that the government
take title to atomic energy research inventions, because such
inventions are thought to have security implications. In 195#,
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When the NASA Act was passed, the Soviet Union aooeared to
pose a space-bound threat to the U.S. -space oatents seemed
to have great military importance. But the DOD had a lic-
ense policy which did not apoear to interfere with national
security, and many members of Congress felt that needed
space work would not be accomplished because of the objec-
tions of NASA contractors to title policy. As a result of
these considerations and pressures, a hybrid patent oolicy
was adopted in which both titles and licenses would be tak-
en at the discretion of the NASA Administrator.
The "Property Rights in Inventions" portion (Section
305) of the 1958 NASA Act can be summarized as follows:
The space agency can claim title to any inventions which
arise from NASA contract work, whether or not such inventions
were anticipated in the contract, and whether or not the in-
ventor had been directly engaged in work on a NASA contract.
The main determining factor in the government’s right to make
a claim to title is that the government has contributed in
some way to the bringing about of the invention, be it through
the use of government funds, facilities, or materials. These
provisions have been criticized by some as allowing NASA in
theory to make a claim on virtually any invention with space
applications, no matter how remotely connected with a NASA
contract. However, up to the present time NASA has shown no
inclination to '’raid” private business for their soace patents.
Every NASA contractor is required by the NASA Act to
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make a prompt and full disclosure in writing of all new tech-
nology arising from contract work. Part of the purpose of
this clause is to assure that space technology be made avail-
able to all who can use it, and not be held in the thrall of
NASA contractors. Unfortunately, because of the nature of
technology transfer, laws alone may not be capable of achiev-
ing this goal of diffusion; technology tends to concentrate
where it originates. In other words, new technology seems
to stay in the labs and companies where it is invented, un-
less they decide to spread it. Also, NASA has been accused
of not fully living up to the intent of the disclosure clause:
&dwin Hoyt in his book The Space Dealers states that NASA has
used its security classification privilege to protect its con-
tractors from "business espionage. "2
Section 305 goes on to say that a contractor may make
a claim to an invention arising from a NASA contract and can
be granted a patent if the NASA Administrator waives the gov-
ernment’s rights to the invention. If the Administrator makes
a claim to the invention, the conflict can be resolved before
a Board of Patent Interferences, and can be appealed to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by either the Administra-
tor or the contractor. It should be noted that given NASA’s
broad powers to claim rights to an invention, a strong expres-
sion of interest in it by the Administrator would tend to
2Edwin P. Hoyt, The Space Dealers
, (New York: John Day
Company, 1971), p. 55.
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discourage a legal action on the part of the contractor. If
a patent is granted to a contractor, and if within five years
the NASA Administrator has reason to believe that the contrac-
tor has engaged in any deception in acquiring the catent, the
patent can be reassigned to the government, subject to the ar>-
peals procedures cited above. NASA is, however, unlikely to
enter into such recall proceedings since it does not even enter
into patent infringement cases, nor do most other government
agencies. It is estimated that about fifty percent of all gov-
ernment patents are illegally infringed uDon, but go unchal-
lenged, because it is government practice not to prosecute
infringers .
3
Probably the most controversial part of Section 305 is
subsection F which deals with waivers. The only guidance
offered the NASA Administrator in granting waivers is that
such grants must be in the "public interest." This, of course,
forces the Administrator to set NASA’s patent policy in the
key area of taking titles vs. licenses. While an examination
of the legislative history of the NASA Act indicates that a
hybrid policy was to be followed, there is nothing in the Act
itself that says this. It appears that the framers of this
legislation tried very hard to "steer a middle course" regarding
3U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, An Evaluation of the Patent Policies of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
, Committee Print, prenared
ior the National Aeronautics and Snace Administration by the De-
partment of Economics, the George Washington University’, Rerort
of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, $9th Cong., 2nd.




patent policy, which is an area that tends to demand "either-
° r ' decisl°ns . The result was that no clear patent policy
was established. It was only due to subsequent controversy
that NASA's patent policy became clearer, although it is still
ratner entangled. It should be pointed out, however, that even
when the Administrator takes title, the contractor is automat-
ically granted a non-exclusive royalty-free license; thus the
contractor is at no time barred from using commercially an
invention resulting from his work for NASA, the only difference
is whether or not he obtains exclusive rights to market the
invention. The NASA Act also allows the Administrator to set
up regulations concerning licenses granted to non-contractors.
After the 1958 NASA Act was passed, NASA promulgated its
regulations relating to waiver and licensing policy. The wai-
ver regulations eventually generated more interest than any
other aspect of NASA’s founding. NASA's Administrator, in
cooperation with his staff of patent counsels, established a
policy in which waivers would be granted in all but exception-
al cases. This was, in other words, a pro-contractor, "license
policy." In those instances when NASA takes title, licenses
would be granted to interested businesses on a royalty-free,
non-exclusive basis. If a patent owned by NASA fails to be
licensed after two years, an exclusive license may be granted.
Although NASA's patent policy was at this point very pro-con-
tractor, there existed among contractors a residue of dissat-
isfaction with it. Having to file petitions for waivers or
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exclusive licenses involves much administrative work, and many
of NASA's aerospace contractors were accustomed to the patent
policy of the DOD, whose license policy is much more forth-
right. NASA's patent policy was still open to changes at this
time, however, since it was somewhat interim in nature.
In the fall of 1962 NASA decided to hold a public hear-
ing before it formalized a set of definitive Patent Waiver Reg-
ulations. NASA, it could be charged, tried to limit those at-
tending the hearing to a particular type of group, for while a
large number of government contractors and other businesses,
who were mostly pro-license policy, were well represented, the
presence of others was minimal. This resulted mainly from the
scheduling of the hearing during the Christmas season, when
many members of Congress return to their home districts. Sena-
tor bstes Kefauver, who was at the hearing, summed up the prob-
lem this way: M I would certainly think that, since Congress has
set the policy with reference to patents, that to announce a
hearing after Congress is gone and to close it before they come
back would be a defiance of Congress that no agency should get
by with. ”4- Senator Kefauver threatened to take the matter of
NASA’s pro-contractor patent policy before his Anti -Trust and
Monopoly Subcommittee unless NASA scheduled another set
^Lawrence R. Caruso, "Inventions in Orbit: The Patent
Waiver Regulations of the National Aeronautics and SDace Ad-
ministration Revisited," Howard Law Journal , XII, 1966, o. 56.
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°f hearings during the next session of Congress at which a
broader range of opinions could be heard. NASA acquiesced
to this demand. After the next hearing, at which many title
policy advocates were heard, NASA’s waiver regulations were
dropped in favor of the patent policy set ud by President
John Kennedy’s Patent Policy Memorandum of 1963 . The licen-
sing regulations were kept, although they too in recent years
have come under scrutiny as the number of space program spin-
offs increases.
The JFK Patent Policy Memorandum of 1963 is adhered to
by NASA in its waiver practices. The Memorandum has been
described as "the first attempt to establish a certain ration-
ale for allocating patent rights government-wide in accordance
with the public interest. "5 The Memorandum is not legally
binding on federal agencies, but NASA adopted it in full, per-
haps to avoid any more disputation. In what possibly can be
interpreted as an unhealthy imitation of NASA’s hybrid patent
policy, the Memorandum also establishes a mixed procedure re-
garding allocation of patent rights. The government (and NASA)
may claim title under the following circumstances: 1. if the
invention was specifically designed for commercial use by the
general public, or government regulations will require it for
5harbridge House Inc., Government Patent Policy Study -
Final Report for the Federal Council on Science and Technology
Committee on Government Patent Policy^ (Boston: Harbridge House
Inc., 1968), "Vol. I, Preface, p. iii.
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public use, 2. if the invention results from a contract in
the field of public health and welfare, 3. if the invention
results from a field of research which is new and primarily
supported by government (such as atomic energy), and which
could become dominated by a contractor if he is allowed to
retain title, 4. if the contract is of a supervisory or man-
agement type (such as General Electric’s supervision of North
American Rockwell in the Apollo Program). If the Durpose of
the contract is to develop items for primarily government use,
or if the research builds upon existing knowledge or technol-
ogy which is directly related to a contractor’s commercial
position, then principal rights to inventions may vest with
the contractor. 6 The Memorandum goes on to state that if con-
tractors holding title do not bring their inventions into use
within three years after a patent issues to them, the govern-
ment can require the contractor to license the invention.
As was the case with NASA’s original patent policy, the
JFK Memorandum has also received criticism; title and license
advocates each accuse it of leaning in the wrong direction,
either towards government or contractors. The title advocates
seem to be on firmer ground, however: an exhaustive study of
government patent policy carried out for the Federal Council
on Science and Technology by Harbridge House Incorporated of
^Ibid . , p . 2
.
36
Boston, Massachusetts, has stated that "the net result of
these operational patterns is that the . . . ’government
title’ criteria will aoply to very few government sponsored
inventions, while the . . . ’government license’ criteria
will apply to the great majority. "7 The license criteria
apply rather neatly to the source of most government spon-
sored inventions, i.e. the Defense Department.
Perhaps it is an indication of the intractability of
the patent policy question that the JFK Memorandum seems more
to legitimate or ratify current agency patent practice rather
than to establish new practices. No government agency seems
to have radically altered its patent policy as a result of
the Memorandum. The Defense Department continues to liberally
grant titles to its contractors, while such ’’public service"
oriented agencies as the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of the Interior continue to take title, since their
research is aimed at producing items which are intended for
use by the general public. It is unfortunately easy to get
the impression that this "government-wide" patent oolicy is
really only an attempt to reduce government-contractor fric-
tion by defining circumstances under which contractors may
take title in terms of the contractor's established commercial
position, rather than in terms of the substantive question of
whether government contractors should be allowed to remain the
? Ibid . , p. 5
•
37
major beneficiaries of government research which the taxpayer,
and not he, has paid for.
Another important defect of the Memorandum’s patent pol-
icy is that it requires rights to inventions to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. The Memorandum permits NASA to be
liberal in granting waivers, but it does not erase the petition-
ing process required by the NASA Act, indeed, it reinforces it.
Petitions for waiver on NASA inventions are carefully studied
in order to assure that the contract meets the Memorandum’s
criteria cited above. Although NASA allows advance waivers
covering all inventions arising from a contract, few contrac-
tors seek these blanket waivers, and NASA has rejected large
numbers on the grounds of poor preparation.
CHAPTER II
NASA'S RECORD AS A GENERATOR OF SPINOFF: A POINT OF DISPUTE
Between 1963 and 1970 NASA has acquired ownership of
438 patents arising from contracts while acquiring licenses
(with title going to contractors) on 340. 1 This is a title-
to-license ratio of about four to three. It is thought that
even more waivers would be granted if contractors understood
NASa s willingness to be liberal with its contractors concer-
ning patents. At least this is the conclusion of an extensive
study of NASA’s patent policy carried out for the Committee on
Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House of Representatives
m 1966 by George Washington University. This study, entitled
>vn Evaluati on of the Patent Policies of the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (and hereafter referred to as
the "GWU report") generally argues that so few inventions
arising from NASA contracts have been commercially successful
that worry over license policy leading to economic concentra-
tion or monopolization is unfounded. Such a conclusion could
be disturbing to those who have thought, perhaps as a result
of NASA press releases, that space research has provided a
^-Federal Council on Science and Technology, Annual
Report on Government Patent Policy, Combined December 1969
and December 1970 . ( Washington, D . C . : UTS . Government Print-
ing Office
, 1971) , pp. 64 - 65 .
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cornucopia of technological spinoffs. The GWU report needs
to be examined in more detail, however, before one can form
a clear picture of the nature of NASA research and why so few
patentable devices have resulted from it.
One of the pitfalls of the patent policy dispute is that
patents tend to be overrated in comparison to other forms of
technological spillover, while the evidence indicates that
just the opposite should be the case. The patent policy dis-
pute tends to be ideological in nature, mixing the practical
problem of maximizing technology transfer with political ques-
tions regarding the rights to inventions; such concerns are
justifiable but the patent policy controversy seems to feed
upon itself while drawing attention away from more complex
and more important forms of technology transfer. The infor-
mation contained in the GWU report indicates that many other
factors in addition to whether or not a contractor holds ex-
clusive rights to an invention affect the invention’s likeli-
hood of achieving commercial success. In fact, patent policy
seems to be of rather minor importance in comparison to the
nature of the invention itself as an incentive for commercial
exploitation. Also, the administrative burden of deciding
patent rights is a heavy one; it seems to hamper technology
transfer without really halting ’’giveaways. " The GWU report
favors contractor rights to government-sponsored inventions
but it tries to avoid ideological questions by basing its
arguments on the ostensibly low value of NASA inventions.
U0
It is perhaps worth noting that the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics also favors a license policy.
The GiVU report begins with a statement of patent policy
goals: 1. the advancement of technology, 2. the promotion of
agency mission, and 3. promotion of other goals of t he govern-
ment. These goals can be achieved, the authors of the report
feel, through a patent policy which pushes government sponsor-
ed inventions into the stream of commerce as quickly as pos-
sible. Under the heading of "advancement of technology" pat-
ent policy can aid such specific aims as disclosure of inven-
tions, utilization of inventions, encouragement of development
of inventions, and the transfer of technology. In terms of
the promotion of agency mission patent policy can affect such
aims as getting the best contractors, and protection in pro-
curement (from having to later pay royalties on government
sponsored inventions). Finally, patent policy can contribute
to other goals of the government such as protection of health
and welfare and avoidance of economic concentration and mono-
poly.
It should be noted that both title and license proponents
have argued that their patent policies will largely fulfill
the above goals, especially the first group under "advancement
of technology." This conflict is directly traceable to a basic
difference of opinion regarding the goals of the patent system
itself. The value of exclusive rights as an incentive to in-
vention is the issue; while some people feel this is the heart
u
of the patent system and indeed any workable system for fos-
tering invention, others believe exclusive rights to be out-
moded and a hindrance to the widest possible utilization of
inventions. NASA’s patent program is based on the former
argument, while the activities of NASA’s Office of Technology
Utilization seem to be founded on the latter. The GWU report’s
statement of preference for a license policy causes the report
to be of questionable objectivity; it tends to treat as closed
the very question which is at the heart of the patent policy
controversy.
The GNU authors’ central argument is that since NASA
inventions have not found any substantial commercial market,
the incentive value of granting patents to contractors is both
needed and not harmful. The authors state that only ten per-
cent of all government patents have found commercial use.^
It should be pointed out, however, that the main source for
such patent utilization information is industry itself. Later
in the GWU report the authors concede that companies could
conceal information on profits derived from government spon-
sored inventions. It is a fact that business has consistently
expressed a desire to retain title whenever patent policy leg-
islation is debated. This was its attitude during the contro-
versy over NASA’s waiver regulations. Edwin Hoyt in his book
^u.S. Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policies of NASA ,
p. 6.
42
The Space Dealers has reported that North American Rockwell,
NASA’s prime contractor on the Apollo Program, has profited
greatly from government work; in the private sector it has
grown to become the nation’s fourth largest auto parts manu-
facturer. Hoyt attributes a large part of this growth to
technology transfer from government research and develonment
contracts; he quotes Willard F. Rockwell, Chairman of the
Board of North American Rockwell as saying "Technology trans-
fer, in brief, is the flow of advanced knowledge, skills, pro-
cesses, and devices between the company’s groups and divisions
for profitable use in broader markets. "3 Thompson - Ramo -
Woodbridge (TRW Inc.) is another company which started out as
Primarily a government contractor but which has since diver-
sified into a broad range of fields (including auto parts,
where it has achieved a dominant position). Hoyt quotes a
TRW brochure as saying that TRW is "a diversified technol-
ogy company, whose scientific and manufacturing talents con-
tribute importantly to the growth of several major industries."^"
It seems evident that private industry does not strictly div-
ide the spinoff effect of government R+D into those which will
be patentable, and those which will not; thus discussing snin-
off strictly in terms of patents, as the GWU renort does, seems
3Hoyt, Space Dealers , pp. 141-142.
^Ibid . , p. 143.
likely to give a misleading impression of the value of soace
program research to the private economy.
One of the implications of following a license or title
patent policy could be that each may set a certain pattern
for the disposition of transferred technology as a whole. It
is possible that this has already happened, for the government
has generally followed a license policy in the past (in terms
of numbers of inventions), and there has concurrently been no
effort on the part of the government to claim rights to non-
patentable forms of spinoff. Present government science nol-
icy exercises little control and appears to evidence insuffi-
cient concern over the results of its research once that re-
search is completed; in terms of technology transfer private
industry alone determines the nongovernmental uses to which
spinoff is put. It should be noted that patent policy merely
determines the degree of exclusivity with which a company may
commercially exploit a government sponsored invention; it can-
not regulate which inventions are picked for development. It
is quite possible that many government inventions of great
potential have not been marketed because they need more devel-
opment than industry is willing to give them, or because they
will not turn a quick profit.
If space program technology is not to rest entirely in
the hands of NASA contractors who may or may not desire to
use it, then a well functioning technology disclosure program
is a necessity. Although NASA contractors are required by
u
law to disclose all new technology arising from space con-
tracts, their disclosure record is a rather poor one. The
G//U report's authors feel that the disclosure record could
be better if the contractors had a better incentive to dis-
close, such as possession of a clear right to any inventions
arising from the contract. "It is common knowledge that com-
mercial research yields far more invention disclosures than
does research by and for the government . "5 This is partly
because commercial labs do research tailored to commercial
demands (it does not mean that the quality of government re-
search is inferior), and partly because companies doing their
own research have active programs aimed at disclosure. Gov-
ernment contractors are not very vigilant regarding disclosure
of spinoffs when the rights to them are in doubt; the govern-
ment and private research activities of these contractors are
divided so that the government can make no legal claim to pri-
vate research inventions. NASA operates a program by which
its in-house researchers (whose inventions automatically be-
come the property of NASA) and also its contractor researchers
may receive cash awards for valuable disclosures, but NASA's
contractor disclosure record remains poor. NASA's disclosure
rate (including its in-house research) is lower than the over-
all government rate: 0.61 disclosures per million dollars spent
on a contract versus 0.99 for all government agencies.
^
5u.S. Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policies of NASA ,
6 lbid., p. 17.
p. 11.
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NASA's in-house disclosure rate is 20 to 30 percent higher
than that of its contractors. 9
Because much of NASA’s research is either ahead of its
time or consists of reliability improvements which do not re-
sult m innovations per se
,
few inventions of immediately evi-
dent commercial potential are produced. Better channels of
communication probably account for NASA’s superior in-house
disclosure rate, although the GWU authors note that "Conceiv-
ably, contractors could channel some of their best inventions
so as to keep them out of the government’s clutches, and would
mostly disclose inventions of no particular interest to them-
selves.” Another factor which could account for the Door con-
tractor disclosure rate is low patent sensitivity. Some indus-
tries, such as aerospace, do not rely on the use of oatents to
a great degree; their manufacturing activities involve the com-
bination of many individual parts over which legal disputes can
be a nuisance. The aerospace industry has long practiced exten-
sive cross-licensing agreements and patent protection is often
not sought for aerospace inventions. The GWU authors estimate
that the aerospace industry holds one-eighth as many Datents
as other comparably large industries. 9 These facts show
7 Ibid., p. 17.




that the importance of patent policy is variable according to
the kind of industry doing government research, but the prob-
lem of technology transfer to non-contractors and civilian
business remains acute.
NASA’s disclosure problem seems subject to three possible
solutions. More contractor rights can be allowed, as the GWU
report suggests, although this reinforces the contractor’s pos-
ition as the major beneficiary of government R+D . The govern-
ment can be more strict in enforcing disclosures, and perhaps
set up a program aimed at developing civilian uses for govern-
ment-wide R+D spinoff, which would be an interesting science
program in itself. Finally, the government could simply cut
back on its research programs which do not seem to have much
value to the civilian economy, i.e. military and space research.
The key question is: what is the ultimate value of military
and space research? The evidence is that those research uro-
grams which receive the most funds, such as military and space
research, produce the most spinoff, at least in terms of raw
volume, although it can be argued that other lines of research
are more fruitful in terms of dollars spent. According to
Federal Council on Science and Technology (FCST) figures, NASA
has received 21,877 invention disclosures between 1963 and
1970.-^ Of these only 1,555 have resulted in patents. 1 ^
IOpqst, Annual Report on Government Patent Policy ,
pp. 50-51.
1 1
lb id . , pp. 54-55, 64-65.
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In comparison with other government agencies, NASA has filed
patent applications on about 10 percent of its disclosures
while "public service" agencies such as the Department of
Agriculture filed h9 percent and the Department of the Inter-
ior, 37 percent. 12
The value of NASA patents seems further diminished when
one examines their utilization record. The GWU report states
that most of NASA's patents are utilized by NASA itself or
other government agencies. Civilian utilization can come about
either through waivers or licenses granted by NASA. Of patents
available for licensing, about 10 percent are licensed, and of
those roughly 20 percent achieve commercial utilization. 11
Several reasons account for this low utilization with patent
policy playing an apparently minor role. In answer to a GWU
report questionnaire, a few companies holding non-exclusive
licenses stated that exclusive rights would have enhanced their
utilization, but a greater proportion felt that "NASA's pat-
ented inventions are not commercialized because the inventions
have government applications only." 1^ Other reasons cited
for non-utilization were: insufficient market demand, suoer-
ior substitutes, technology which is too sonhisticated
,
insuf-
ficient time elapsed for an invention to find a use, and high
12 Ibid., pp. 102 -103 .
Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policy of NASA ,
pp. 31, 35 .
u Ibid., p. 39.
development costs. It should be remembered, however, that
only invention usage is being discussed here, and the imDor-
tance of NASA's patentable inventions is probably minimal,
as the Denver Research Institute report (which will be dis-
cussed later) indicates. The value of overall sDace technol-
ogy is more difficult to ascertain.
Most of NASA's inventions which find their way into the
private sector do so through the operation of the waiver doI-
icy. uf course, the granting of waivers is limited to NASA
contractors. The GWU report's authors interpret the legisla-
tive history of the patent provisions of the NASA Act to in-
dicate that a "flexible" patent policy was to be followed
wnicn would provide a balance between the needs of government
and the preservation of incentives to use NASA spinoff. In
accordance with this, NASA ostensibly is to retain the rights
to "major" inventions, while "humdrum" inventions were to be
made the object of the incentives of the patent system. Such
a policy towards the disposition of rights to government spon-
sored inventions indicates the lack of resolution of the basic
patent policy dispute, for if patent incentives are the best
way to achieve the transfer of inventions to the private sector,
one wonders why this logic should not apply to all NASA inven-
tions. It is interesting to note that the government's legal
right to spinoff inventions is a strong one: in the private
sector those who pay for research have a common law right to
inventions resulting from it, yet the GWU authors seem to deny
U9
this right to the government. They argue that the taxpayer
pays only once for spinoff inventions when bought from a pri-
vate company which holds a patent to them because spinoff is
an unforeseen and unplanned aspect to research. This seems
tantamount to saying that taxpayer interest in government
science programs should be limited strictly to the goals of
particular contracts; the license policy argument by implica-
tion defines ’’government science” very narrowly while at the
same time the government has been treating it broadly as a
great source of spinoff beneficial to the public as a whole.
Petitions for patent waivers are evaluated by NASA’s
Inventions and Contributions Board ( ICB ) with great care.
Under the guidelines of the JFK Memorandum the waiver peti-
tioners must clearly show that their acquisition of title will
not lead to their dominance of a particular field of technol-
ogy and that acquiring title is really necessary for marketing
the invention. The former proviso can cause problems for small
business contractors since these companies are often one-product
oriented. This is another example of lack of consistency in
NASA's patent policies because the small contractors are more
likely than the big contractors to try to put on the civilian
market inventions arising out of their government contract
work. The JFK Memorandum provisos may seem harsh, but the ICB
has been quite willing to grant waivers, usually turning con-
tractors down on the average only two out of ten cases of
50
petitions for individual inventions
.
1 5 The NASA Administra-
tor makes the final decision on waivers, and he usually agrees
with the findings of the IGB
.
The JFK Memorandum provisos embody the drawback of being
rather subjective. The GWU report enumerates four problems
which are embodied in the decision making process regarding
waivers: 1. definition of ’‘field of technology” (which osten-
sibly should not be dominated by any one company) is difficult
since fields of technology overlap and boundaries are everchang-
ing; this tends to favor the granting of waivers, 2. the legal
rights of non-profit contractors are hard to establish because
the JFK Memorandum does not speak of them as ’’contractors” al-
though much work is done for NASA by universities and "think
tanks”; it appears that only profit making companies qualify
as waiver holders, 3« the operation of the waiver policy is
very time-consuming: on the average it takes ten months to
process a waiver petition (to eventually acquire a patent may
easily take three years or more), 4. the activities of the
Office of Technology Utilization, which operates the licensing
program, sometimes conflict with the operations of the patent
branch. The OTU makes public through its various publications
information on various NASA spinoff devices and processes; it
does not wait until contractors have selected the inventions
in which they are interested and leave the chaff for the
-^ Ibid . f p. 66.
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licensing program. Thus it sometimes happens that OTU publi-
cizes a device for licensing which is also involved in a con-
tractor waiver petition. The GWU report states that the con-
tractor response to the waiver program has been sluggish, which
is not surprising considering its complexity. The GWU report
states that NASA has an undeserved reputation for being unwil-
ling to grant waivers which a public relations project could
remedy, but it is difficult to see how contractors could be
encouraged to petition for waivers given the ever-increasing
time needed to process them under the government’s present
program to regulate patent policy in the public interest.
Such NASA contractors as General Electric, Westinghouse
,
RCA,
and General Telephone and Electronics rank among the top pro-
ducers of new inventions each year.^-6 It is hard to believe
that these innovative companies do not create many inventions
under NASA contracts. How many of these inventions circuit-
ously find their way into a contractor’s commercial business
is unfortunately difficult to determine.
By the GWU report’s measurements 11.5 percent of NASA
waivers have been commercially utilized, while 60 percent have
government usefulness .
^
The commercial potential of NASA in-
ventions tends to increase over time; few inventions regardless
l6 lbid.
17 Ibid . , pp. 68, 71.
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of their source achieve quick use. Often a patent exoires on
an invention before it achieves commercial importance. This
must be recognized when studying NASA’s utilization record.
In terms of development costs of waived inventions, the GWU
report found that they were about evenly divided between low
(under $5,000), medium ($5,000 to $50,000), and high ($50,000
and up). Thus it cannot be said that NASA inventions are al-
ways so exotic that only much development work which must be
covered by exclusive patent rights for contractors, will bring
the inventions into the commercial market. The GWU rerort con-
cludes that there is little evidence that NASA contractors have
made great profits on NASA waivers; to the end of 1965, the
companies holding waivers had spent more on development than
they had received in sales revenue. The authors of the GWU
report note that, while they do not think it probable, MFor
all we know, some business firm might . . . conceal from public
knowledge the large profits it has been making from one of
these inventions. ”^-9
A fundamental problem inhibiting transfer of technology
T’is the almost universal segregation [from the commercial
sector J of government-financed research and development.” 20
l B Ibid . . p. 75.
19lbid., p . 87 .
2Q Ibid . , p. 90.
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In the rush of NASA work inventions can be "lost" because of
poor disclosure practices. But the license policy recommended
by the GWU authors seems likely to reinforce this segregation,
because it minimizes the government’s responsibility towards
the fruits of its science programs. Perhaps what is needed
in the space program is a system of Research Associations like
those in Great Britain in which government and business both
contribute to research activities; as the space program matures,
more and more of its research will be of a practical nature;
a way will need to be found to acknowledge the taxpayer’s in-
vestment. Unfortunately, the establishment of Comsat as a
private, profit-making corporation (which still depends on
NASA research for hardware and techniques) shows that the gov-
ernment’s research role and contribution is still being ignored.
CHAPTER III
NASA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES
NASA’S Technology Utilization Program, and the activ-
ities of the Science and Technology Information Division
represent the most advanced post R+D operations conducted
by any government agency. Their existence is a recognition
that the patent system alone may not be adequate to the tech-
nology transfer problem. TUP not only licenses NASA inven-
tions but also promotes other forms of NASA technology.
Although TUP is meant to serve the private sector, the same
segregation between government and business tends to be pre-
sent in the TUP approach, which is an ex post facto one.
There is evidence that technology transfer occurs best when
a company has great familiarity with that technology, which
usually arises only when the company carries on the research
itself. Nevertheless the Office of Technology Utilization
is faced with the task of trying to match up aspects of NASA
technology with possible non-contractor business uses. Also,
the technology evaluation process is carried on by NASA per-
sonnel, who are probably not in a very good position to anti-
cipate the needs of various private companies.
In an article called "The Technological Impact of the
U.S. Space Program" by Clotaire Wood (NASA European Reore-
sentative) the activities of the Office of Technology
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Utilization, under which the Technology Utilization Division
and the Science and Technology Information Division operate,
are described as follows: "The program is designed to short-
en the time between the development and use of new knowledge;
aid the movement of this knowledge across industry, discin-
linary, and regional boundaries; stretch the returns from
aerospace research dollars by finding additional uses for
the results; and develop better ways of communicating and
applying government generated technology in the private ec-
onomy." 1 The statement indicates that unlike the license
policy advocates, the people in the OTU do not define govern-
ment science narrowly; their activities constitute an ambi-
tious five million dollar a year program aimed at bringing
the fruits of space research to a wide cross-section of the
economy.
The TUP program works as follows: Specialists called
Technology Utilization Officers (TUO) work in major NASA
field installations reviewing R+D (both in-house and con-
tractor-disclosed) for promising new ideas. Reports from
the field centers filed by the TUO are evaluated at NASA
headquarters and also by independent research institutes.
Inventions or technology which appear promising are announ-
ced in various TUP publications. Which publication is chosen
British Scientific Instrument Research Association,
Innovation for Profit , (London: Adam Hilger Ltd., 1963),
p. T36.
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depends on the nature of the innovation and how much des-
cription it needs. "Tech Brief" is the most commonly used
publication. Since 196S more than two thousand issues of
Tech Brief have been published describing such NASA spinoff
as a new brushless DC electric motor, low cost insulation
for pipes carrying very cold liquids, improved fuel cells,
a leakproof valve for corrosive chemicals, and an almost
frictionless alloy. These NASA publications are distributed
to industry, universities, research institutes, the trade
and business press, and libraries at no charge.
The OTU f s Science and Technology Information Division
deals with the volume of information which cannot be handled
through TUP publications. STID operates the "Regional Dis-
semination Centers" (RDC) which contain computerized files
on space program technology. A business can subscribe (at
the cost of a service charge) to an RDC service by which
NASA files are periodically scanned for information of 00 s-
sible use to that business. In one six month period, NASA
employees scanned with computer help 63,000 abstracts for
Ball Brothers Company of Muncie, Indiana; 153 abstracts were
found useful to the company. As of 1969, RDC’s held lists
of 700,000 abstracts and were adding 6,000 reports a month.
Edwin Hoyt, author of The Space Dealers , notes that
by virtue of the great volume of research results that come
out of NASA, the activities of the OTU inevitably involve
NASA in general business affairs. And this appears to be
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true regardless of disputes over the worth of space tech-
nology as a whole to the commercial market. Yet it should
be noted that this involvement is rather one-sided; govern-
ment and private industry as a whole really do not interact.
Glotaire Vyood notes that OTU is mainly concerned with spread-
ing "the incremental advances that singly seem of minor im-
portance, but which in combination are the foundation of our
industrial strength. "2 This is a laudable activity but
there may be no substitute for the familiarity and understand-
ing of a certain field of technology which comes about through
contract work. It would seem likely that the same worries
which plague the title advocates about a liberal patent doI-
icy should also apply to the non-patentable technology, but
this latter form of spinoff for some reason seems to have
been left out of the ongoing debate on NASA patent policies
and their implications. Perhaps it is felt that non-patent-
able spinoff is very difficult to channel or control, which
is probably true, and which is all the more reason to estab-
lish a government“business relationship in the conduct of
government science that recognizes contractors as the Dri-
mary beneficiaries.
The innovation evaluation systems of both the patent
branch and the OTU are a key element in the technology trans-
fer process. Not all new technology disclosed by contractors
2 lbid., p. 190.
5 $
is considered sufficiently important to warrant filing a
patent application or promotion by the OTU, thus a selec-
tion process must take place. If a NASA researcher (or con-
tractor researcher) creates an innovation which he thinks
has commercial potential, he notifies his supervisor accor-
dingly. If the researcher fails to recognize the commercial
potential the invention could be lost unless someone at a
later time reviews his work thoroughly. The supervisor re-
views the disclosure and fills out an official NASA evalua-
tion form asking him his opinion of its novelty, oerformance,
and potential government and/or commercial applications.
This evaluation is termed a "technical'’ one by NASA, but it
is hard to understand how opinions on commercial usefulness
can be purely technical.
In the patent branch this "technical” evaluation is
forwarded to the local NASA Patent Counsel who studies the
disclosure and gives it a "P-1" rating, which means that
the disclosure appears to warrant filing a patent applica-
tion, or a "P-2" rating, which indicates that the disclosure
will be held on a stand-by status until more information on
it can be sent, or a "P-3" rating, which means that the dis-
closure does not warrant patenting. It can be argued that
neither NASA scientists nor its legal personnel are partic-
ularly well qualified to evaluate market potential. The
local patent counsel is asked to judge whether the disclosed
invention is 1. of primary importance to aeronautical or
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space activities (in which case NASA may wish to retain
title to it), or 2. a ’’pioneer discovery,” or 3. a substan-
tial advancement of the art, or 4. the subject of existing
or prospective government production or use, or 5. an inven-
tion with substantial promise of commercial utility,-^ Posi-
tive findings on these criteria will warrant patenting of
the disclosed invention. The local Patent Counsel priority
rating is then reviewed at NASA headquarters by the Office
of the Assistant General Counsel for Patent matters. If
the decision is made to file a patent application with the
U.S. Patent Office NASA will proceed to file, unless a con-
tractor files a petition for waiver, in which case the In-
ventions and Contributions Board and the NASA Administrator
will determine the rights to the invention according to the
’’public interest."
A selection process must also take place in the Technol
ogy Utilization Program since it is impossible to nublish in-
formation on all NASA technology. Although it is the goal of
the OTU to achieve "the widest possible dissemination to the
public of information regarding the agency’s new technology,
letting industry itself select the items in which it is inter
ested,”^ only the RDC’s really tap the total information
^Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study,
Vol • III, p. 8 .
^Ibid . , p. 9.
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reservoir, and even in that operation NASA personnel must
intervene between the company and the spinoff information.
In the TUP program the Technology Utilization Offi cer as-
signed to local NASA field installations reviews disclosures
and prepares "flash sheets" on interesting items. He too,
like his patent branch counterpart, must decide on a disclo-
sure’s "commercial potential." His flash sheet, along with
any needed supporting documentation, is sent to an "evalua-
ting institution," either a consulting firm or a university,
which is also to determine commercial potential. The eval-
uating institution returns the disclosure to NASA in a "pub-
lishability category." The TUO reviews this evaluation and
sends it and the disclosure along to the Operations Branch
Chief of the Technology Utilization Division for a final
decision on publication.
Two things need to be noted about this process; first,
the initial evaluation is probably the most important one,
yet as the Harbridge House report says, "In practice, how-
ever, this initial evaluation is largely subjective and the
result of admittedly personal opinion. "5 And secondly,
"commercial potential," like the eventual value of a patent,
is one of the greatest imponderables in the technology trans-





evaluating personnel and their "technical" approach to the
problem for, to quote the Harbridge House report again,
"At no point does the evaluating process accroach a market
survey, including such factors as costs, engineering esti-
mates, market potential, and so forth. There is agreement
within the Office of Technology Utilization that public funds
should not be expended for this purpose. "6 Again there ap-
pears a lack of consistency in NASA concerning spinoff: tech-
nological spillover is "given away," but a market survey,
which could be quite useful in making the value of certain
NAoA inventions or technology evident to businesses, espec-
ially non-contractors, is shied away from because of scrucles
about public funds. The OTU speaks of making scace program
technology available to the "public" yet present government
patent policies limit the granting of licenses by contractors
to "responsible" applicants (probably other businesses) cap-
able of utilizing government inventions.? It is as if no one
wants to recognize that spinoff will be used to make money
and profits.
An innovation can be promoted by the patent branch,
or the OTU, or both. Theoretically these promotional activi-
ties are to be coordinated at the local level, but if they
are not, "they are simply not coordinated at all, which
6Ibid
. , p . 9
.
?FCST, Annual ReDort on Government Patent Policy,
p. 157.
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sometimes happens." 8 Aside from the problem of differing
underlying philosophies regarding the value of exclusive
rights to inventions as an incentive to bring them into
use, which route is picked at the local level for promotion
of an invention can result "purely and simply because dif-
ferent people’s knowledge of the state of the art differs." 9
In other words, a Technology Utilization Officer may recog-
nize commercial potential where a Patent Counsel does not,
or vice versa. Like determinations as to whether the govern-
ment or a contractor should get patent rights, determinations
over which innovations are picked for publicizing are depen-
dent on many subjective criteria which NASA people working
at the local level may not be able to cope with adequately.
NASA also engages in less formal technology transfer
activities such as symposia and person-to-person contacts
between government and industry scientists which in the
long run could be quite effective because they afford the
observation of NASA research Projects on a more intimate,
step-by-step basis, similar to the kind of familiarity that
a contractor scientist has with a space project. The activ-
ities of the OTU are necessarily focused on end-products,
,bHarbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study,
Vol . Ill, p. 10.
9 Ibid.
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and to quote the Harbridge House Study: ’’NASA’s role is lar-
gely reactive in terms of finding firms to practice NASA owned
inventions. After promotion of inventions, NASA relies on in-
terested parties to request licenses.” 10 There is evidence
that the publication of information on an innovation, which is
one of the major functions of the patent system, is often not
enough to bring about interest in and use of an invention. To
the extent that the OTU programs mirror this publication func-
tion (except that it applies to technology and not just inven-
tions], the programs may suffer from the same kind of inadequacy.
The effectiveness of the OTU program is difficult to de-
termine, as is the value to the economy of space technology
as a whole. There are, of course, many individual examnles of
of effective technology transfer into the civilian market.
Glotaire Wood cites the following examples of TUP insDired tech-
nology transfer: a TV picture enhancement technique developed
for the Mariner deep space probes is now being used to clarify
medical x-ray pictures. RDC documents helped a company refine
its methods of growing crystals for industrial use and thus
helped the company to increase its sales by one hundred thousand
dollars a year. More than one hundred companies have expressed
interest in marketing a tough inorganic paint which NASA devel-
oped for its spacecraft. A discovery by NASA scientists that
hexagonal crystal structure provides a superior bearing
10 Ibid . t p. 12.
material is being promoted by the TUP and is expected to
have great industrial and medical (in artificial joints)
applications. Biomedical sensors developed for astronauts
are now used in many intensive care units in hospitals.
Unfortunately, while the citing of such transfer cases en-
hances the space program's image, it does not constitute a
statistically significant presentation.
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
The Denver Research Institute, operated by the Univer-
sity of Denver has carried out a study aimed at determining
the value of aerospace research to the rest of the economy.
This study, entitled The Commercial Applications of Missile /
Space Technology , reached the conclusion that because of the
nature of most technology transfer, it is extremely difficult
and perhaps impossible to fix a definite value on missile/
space technology. The Denver study is useful in that its
findings undermine the use of the patent system as a primary
technology transfer device, and indicate that ex post facto
attempts to control space program "fallout" in the oublic in-
terest may not work because of the great complexity of the
technology transfer process.
The Denver report states at the outset that its under-
taking has been in response to fears that too much money is
being spent on missile/space technology. Thus its main effort
was to identify interactions between such technology and the
economy as a whole. The report emphasizes that aerosnace and
non-aerospace technology are closely interwoven. Eleven "Major
Findings and Conclusions" are cited in the report: 1. Transfer
of technology has been by far the most important contribution
of missile/space technology to the economy. 2. A portion of
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the technology advanced by missile/space programs has found,
and will continue to find application in commercial industry
for non-aerospace purposes. 3 . A time-lag exists between the
development of missile/space devices and processes and their
commercial application, i.e. most commercial applications have
yet to occur but are expected. A. Relatively little importance
can be attached to direct transfer of specific products (such
as those which are patentable). "It is more accurate and mean-
ingful to consider missile/space contributions to the commer-
cial sector of the economy in terms of the transfer of technol-
ogy rather than in terms of a transfer of products.
The fifth conclusion states that six types of contribu-
tion of missile/space technology are: a. stimulus of basic
and applied science (addition to the basic store of knowledge),
b. development of new or improved processes and techniques,
c. improvement of existing products, i.e. development of better
quality and reliability in products is an important contribu-
tion of missile/space R+D . Further contributions are: d. in-
creased availability of advanced materials, testing equipment,
and laboratory equipment which can be used in non-aerosnace
activities, e. development of specific new products - these
are less significant in comparison to overall missile/snace
contributions because single devices are static whereas
^-Denver Research Institute, The Commercial Applications
of Missile/Space Technology , (Denver : University of Denver,
1963
) , p. v.
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technology has a wide range of applications, and f. cost re-
duction - this is an often overlooked contribution: soace work
can raise the volume of production to the point where "exotic”
items become low cost, for example, solar cells. Also, sDace
work has raised the level of management and production techni-
ques, which is a cost reduction contribution. It should be
noted that few of these contributions can be easily channeled
either to or away from certain designated beneficiaries, such
as contractors or non-aerospace businesses.
The Denver report continues its list of conclusions as
follows: 6. Attribution of given technological advances to
one source is often impossible - knowledge is too closely
interconnected for that. 7. It does not appear feasible to
measure in quantitative terms the economic impact of missile/
space technology. 3. Insufficient understanding of the nature
of the transfer process seems to have led to widely divergent
opinions on the value of missile/space technology to the econ-
omy. 9. Diffusion of secondary ( non-aerosoace ) uses is much
slower than diffusion of primary uses, with informal communi-
cation channels possibly playing a more important role than
formal channels. 10. There are gaps between persons and or-
ganizations doing missile/space work and those companies can-
able of applying space technology commercially. These gaos
exist even between divisions within the same company; in other
words specific lines of technology tend to concentrate where
they originate. 11. Technology transfer and utilization are
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hampered by lack of understanding about how technology is
applied at the level of the firm.
The foregoing points indicate that evaluating the eco-
nomic importance of space research in terms of specific pro-
ducts or discoveries does not take in all the forms of contri-
bution. The technological contribution which is incremental
and diffuse is probably more important. The Denver report
even refuses to use the terms "spinoff" and "fallout" feeling
that they tend to imply that missile/space technology contri-
butions are only accidental or unimportant. "To the contrary,
some instances of contribution from the missile/space effort
are expected, [and_] may prove to be of more significance than
their progenitor; and the possible commercial market is as
strong a motivation for their development as their more appar-
ent missile/space market." 2 The report uses the term "contri-
bution" rather than "by-product": "The total contribution of
missile/space R+D to the commercial economy is broader, more
complex, more indirect, and more difficult to identify than
is generally realized. "3
If the government's investment in soace research is to
be recognized it seems that a form of dual investment, such
as occurs in the British Research Associations may be neces-
sary; if contractors complain that they do not make money on




space spinoffs, then the government may consider going into
the space business itself by doing more in-house research
and refrain from turning space operations (such as communica-
tion satellites systems) over to private enterprise. If it
is true that space research is too specialized to be of much
general use, then perhaps more funds should be placed in other
fields of research. It should be noted that a dual funded
Research Association could also engage in studies aimed at
finding uses lor space devices here on earth, and non-contrac-
tors could also join this phase of the program for a fee.
The Denver Report investigated the information flow as-
pects of technology transfer, and as could be expected, the
originators of certain lines of technology, i.e. the contrac-
tors tend to be the first "recipients" of transfer. In renly
to a survey, "close customer contact" was cited by businesses
as the primary source of knowledge about space technology.
Other sources included technical and trade journals, meetings,
committees and symposia, literature search, and finally, pat-
ents. Small companies not involved in the missile/space mar-
ket, when surveyed as to their opinions on how technology
transfer could be enhanced, cited first "easier access to
and prompter reporting of research results." Many companies
asserted that they were satisfied with present information
transfer activities but a desire was expressed by others to
become involved in space work as contractors: these companies
wanted the government to make better known its desires and
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requirements in space contracts, to better familiarize itself
with the capabilities of small businesses, and to be generally
more willing to accept small concerns as missile/soace contrac-
tors. These latter companies perhaps recognize the value of
"close customer contact.” To quote the Denver reoort: "Exceot
in those instances where the same organizational unit generates
the missile/space technology, and apolies this technology in
products it sells, it seems possible that there are relatively
few cases of direct communication of technology from original
innovator to final user or applier." 14' The Denver renort’s
authors state that technology is usually filtered, evaluated,
and otherwise relayed; the process is comnlex and is one of
diffusion. The authors suggest that the transmittal and receo-
tion of information on space technology is only one nart of the
technology transfer process, and both it and the whole diffusion
process are in need of basic research so that technology trans-
fer can be enhanced.
The Denver report does not judge the overall impact of
missile/space technology on the economy in quantitative terms
because such quantification is infeasible. Space and non-snace
technology are closely interwoven; tracing a certain nroduct
or improvement back to a single source is often imnossible.
Determination of the amount of sales due to advances in s^ace
technology is a dubious undertaking, since the space technology
^Ibid
. , p. 17.
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contribution may take the form of improved quality or better
management technique. Space technology’s impact on the Gross
National Product is difficult to ascertain because its secon-
dary and tertiary permutations fuse with other forms of tech-
nology. Time lag militates against quantification; it is
estimated that at least five to ten years are needed for mis-
s il e/space technology to reach the commercial market, and by
that time its form may be substantially altered. This is not
to say that the missile/space contribution is insignificant;
on the contrary, the Denver report notes that a pattern of
contribution already exists and that bigger contributions are
expected as the technology diffuses into the economy.
The main points of Part Two can be summarized as follows:
1. NASA’s technology transfer operations are oriented towards
patents yet the efficacy of the patent system as a technology
transfer device is doubtful; 2. NASA's hybrid patent policy
is inconsistent and reveals a lack of resolution of basic is-
sues behind the title vs. license dispute; 3. the present NASA
patent policies are complicated, they probably discourage in-
terest in NASA inventions without really halting ’’giveaways"
;
4. NASA patent policies and Office of Technology Utilization
operations necessarily focus on end-products while close asso-
ciation with a line of space technology which only contractors
achieve is probably the best way to understand and anticipate
the potential of that line of technology; 5. NASA’s invention
evaluation processes are a poor substitute for the contractor’s
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advantage, and are plagued by many subjective criteria;
6. a segregation exists between government research and
its eventual non-government application - this segregation
could be remedied and technology transfer (and not just
invention transfer) enhanced in a Research Association
through which contractors and other interested businesses
would participate in developing civilian uses for snace
technology. Since both business and government would con-




Ihe theoretical and factual data connected with pre-
sent NASA patent policy seem to impel one to certain con-
clusions about public policy making in this area which fit
into the comprehensivist way of looking at things. In order
to present these conclusions it would perhaps be useful to
briefly recap the theoretical arguments presented in the
first part of this paper, and then cite the weaknesses of
NASA patent policy as it works out in practice. It should
become apparent through doing this that incrementalism is
largely inappropriate in the realm of patent policy. Yet
it should also be pointed out that comprehensivism
,
while
valuable, does not appear able to supply a perfect solution
to the problem of patent policy either.
To state the problem simply, there is no real NASA
policy over patent rights. What does exist is a law cover-
ing NASA inventions which gives the NASA Administrator dis-
cretion to decide on patent rights, what also exists is
ample opportunity for special interest influence in this
area. Ironically, the cooperation between NASA and its
contractors does not appear to have enhanced technology
transfer, on the contrary, the system which has evolved
for handling space research spinoff seems to prevent such
transfer from reaching its maximum potential. The basic
stumbling block to effective technology transfer seems to
be the recognition by NASA of contractor rights to spinoff
inventions, and it can be well argued that such recognition
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is on rather shaky legal ground. In terms of incremental-
ist reasoning, however, contractor influence is legitimate.
Thus we must first turn to incrementalism’s theoretical
arguments in this conclusion.
To be incrementalist is to favor small steps rather
than big ones in changing government programs. Such caution
is recommended by the incrementalists because they believe
that the choices facing policy makers are much too complex
i or them to handle. Yet it could be argued that incremen-
talists view complex situations as being all alike in their
unwieldiness, while in the patent policy area certain fac-
tors exist which tend to mitigate its complexity. The over-
all d i ssat i si ac t i on with NASA patent policy of nearly every-
body affected by it has caused numerous studies of the prob-
lem to be made. These studies in turn allow one to discern
not only the points of disagreement between title and lic-
ense policy advocates, they also indicate weaknesses of NASA
patent policy about which all parties agree. Incrementalists
have long argued that partisan analysis is more reliable than
non-partisan analysis because it is likely to be focused on
a narrow area and deeply gone into. Yet it is difficult to
see why one should not be able to evaluate differing parti-
san analyses with a view to finding their common elements
and proposing new solutions to their disagreements. This
is the very process that Charles Lindblom describes as occur-
ring between competing groups when they arrive at new and
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unanticipated solutions to their disputes. Thus the incre-
mentalists seem to be saying that complex problems can be
solved by competing groups but not by independent research-
ers, which seems to be a rather arbitrary position. It can
be said with reasonable assurance that no one finds the pre-
sent fuzzy nature of NASA patent policy to be advantageous;
it results in too much red tape and uncertainty for develop-
ment of spinoff inventions to look like an attractive propo-
sition. What seems to be needed is a technology transfer
program that does not get snarled up in legal disputes over
what invention belongs to whom; a proposal for such a pro-
gram will be described at the end of this chapter. The
establishment of such a program would, of course, be a com-
prehensivist approach to the problem of patent policy because
the program would deal with all types of technology, not
just patentable inventions.
Another incrementalist argument stipulates the pre-
sence of a balance of power between interest groups which
supposedly reduces the need for government to protect itself
from them. But natural competition between interest groups
in the patent policy area does not seem present. Perhaps
it could be argued that such a balance of power is more
likely to occur in conventional political settings such as
the labor policy field where the conflict situations are
not too varying, and the participants come to know each other
fairly well. In the realm of patent policy, however, such
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set piece battles replete with "rules of the game" do not
occur. Instead we seem to have a NASA— industrial complex
on one side and a few academics and congressmen on the other
side. It is hard to see which interest grouos would serve
as natural competition to government contractors which re-
ceive favorable treatment in regard to patent rights. The
most likely candidates would be those businesses which do
not do government contract work, but which nevertheless
could make use of various spinoff inventions. Unfortunately,
these 'have not" companies do not have very much in common
except the negative factor of being left out. The course
and fruits of scientific research appear to be too unore-
dictable for the formation of interest groups other than
the participants in government science themselves. In the
patent policy area, incrementalists seem to find a surfeit
of complexity in one field, that of problem analysis, while
on the other hand they seem to oversimplify, or make unwar-
ranted assumptions about group processes in the formation
of patent policy.
It is quite true that pressure groups have influenced
patent policy, yet it is hard to find comfort in incremen-
talism's claim that this is a healthy phenomenon. It can
be argued that interest group influence is, as Lowi claims,
a corruptor of democratic government rather than an adjunct
to it. The fact that NASA's waiver and licensing policy
was established in 195# mainly by the NASA Administrator
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and his staff of patent counsels would seem to indicate that
policy vacuums are not necessarily filled in a democratic
manner. NASA’s initial patent policy was apparently pattern-
ed with very little reflection or questioning after that of
the DOD • Also, NASA’s patent policy hearings in 1962 were,
in a d_e facto sense, limited to industry representatives,
which was hardly democratic. As both these examples indicate,
the incrementalist idea that the public’s wishes are somehow
communicated up through interest grouDs to policy makers is
plainly not the case in the patent policy field • When the
Congress delegates its responsibilities to administrative
agencies, a power vacuum exists, and this vacuum seems to
be filled by those entities potent enough to make their wish-
es felt, be they agencies, clientele, or both. It should be
noted that the public policies that result from this process
are not necessarily consistent, effective, or democratic,
which should not be surprising since their formation is,
in a sense, rather haphazard.
The blurring of the boundary line between the public
and private sectors, which does not disturb incrementalists,
seems partly responsible for the apparent ineffectiveness
of patent policy as a technology transfer device. One attri-
bute of interest group influence is a non-resolution of basic
issues; this is part of its haphazardness. Space research
and development is not, and will probably never be a perfectly
public or private interprise, yet some instrumentality needs
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to take responsibility for space research spinoff in order
for it to reach its maximum potential. Disputes over own-
ership of technological spinoff interfere with technology
transfer because the boundary line between what belongs to
the public and what belongs to private parties is not in
practice very clear. Under these circumstances contractors
are uncertain about how much investment they should make in
a spinoff invention, but at the same time they are reluctant
to relinquish all claims to it.
The relationship between NASA and industry is one of
cooperation but it seems to be cooperation of a sort in which
the roles and contributions of each side are poorly defined.
Thus the present patent policy muddle came about in part
because both public and private sectors were trying to do
two opposite things at the same time: contractor influence
and NASA's receptivity to it is one form of public/private
cooperation," but each side also felt compelled in setting
NASA patent policy to exercise self-assertion and self-inter-
est. Therefore NASA tries to spread soinoff technology to
non-contractors in order to polish the image of space research
as a contributor to the national economy, while the contrac-
tors continue to assert their right to spinoff inventions
arising from contract work. What seems to be needed is a
definitive expression of public policy regarding space re-
search patents which would be made at a higher level than
that of the participants themselves. Cooperation between
so
the public and private sectors is a prerequisite for effec-
tive technology transfer, and the Research Association pro-
posal, which will be discussed later, might remedy many of
the difficulties of the present ownership-oriented technol-
ogy transfer system.
One final aspect of the theoretical controversy betwee
incrementalists and comprehensivists should be touched upon,
and that is their disagreement over the presence of values
in analysis of political phenomena. Incrementalists seem
to take on a cloak of neutrality in their political analy-
ses, while comprehensivists see nothing wrong with being
influenced by values. It must be said that if this paper
were written from an incrementalist point of view it would
seem impossible to treat the basic unfairness of NASA’s
patent policy as a matter of concern. Thus one of the pri-
mary catalysts of the title advocates would be eliminated.
It can be argued that values have practical utility in the
sense that they are analogous to the self interest motiva-
tion of the pressure group analysts. Indeed it could be
said that an offended sense of justice is a stimulus to
both guardians of the public interest and guardians of
special interests. Yet if we were to follow an incremen-
talist course in resolving the patent policy problem, non-
contractors would probably continue to be discriminated
against because questions of fairness to out-group members
do not seem to be very important to incrementalists. Also,
taxpayers would be committed to the long-term support of
certain companies which incrementalists would perhaps fat-
alistically accept.
In the final analysis, comprehensivism seems to be
the best path to follow in trying to straighten out the
patent policy muddle, although comprehensivists may have
to settle for a less than complete victory. As Francis E.
Rourke points out, expertise presents a challenge to the
cherished beliefs of both comprehensivism and incremental-
ism. This is because expertise is a source of bureaucratic
power in itself. Expertise does not fit well into the in-
crementalist group process model, thus the need for some
outside controls over experts is apparent. On the other
hand, the intrinsic worth of specialized knowledge challen-
ges the comprehensivist * s distrust of localist power. On
balance our science policy seems to stand in need of more,
and not less goal-setting and coordination. It could be
argued that a small group of people such as contractors and
scientists do not constitute a science policy ''constituency,"
and that such a constituency really ought to be thought of
as the public as a whole. But at the same time it must be
said that it is hard to make science recognize legal boun-
dary lines. It should not, however, be impossible to formu-
late public policies which allow the public and private
sectors to cooperate in enhancing technology transfer through
programs which are fair to non-contractors, and not incidental!
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which recognize the public's ultimate right to research
spinoff which it has paid for.
Now we shall briefly review the factual data connected
with the patent policy problem. The legal framework behind
AoA s patent policy is characterized by vagueness and at
the same time great complexity. Section 305 of the NASA
Act of 1958, which deals with "Property Rights in Inventions"
fails to define in whom those property rights should vest.
It is true that NASA is given the prerogative to lay claim
to virtually any invention arising from space program re-
search, but in practice it is the NASA Administrator who
makes the final decision. Despite the fact that the realm
patents is a highly legalistic one where clear language and
intention would seem essential, the NASA Administrator is
admonished by the NASA Act only to act "in the public inter-
est" in deciding on patent rights. Such evasion of basic
issues and delegation of power are hallmarks of incremental-
ism but they seem highly inappropriate to patent oolicy.
Where Section 305 was vacant of any guides regarding
the disposition of patent rights, the JFK Memorandum on
patent policy, which NASA adopted, can be said to provide
too many guidelines. The JFK policy attempts to define cir-
cumstances by which it can be decided on a case-by-case basis
whether the public interest is served by the government or
the contractor taking title. The JFK policy is on no firmer
ground than Section 305 because the basic question of the
#3
taxpayer’s right to spinoff is not grappled with. Instead,
the JFK waiver policies are quite openly adjusted to, among
other things, the contractor’s commercial interest in an
invention. Because of this favoritism towards contractors,
NASA's licensing program, which is aimed at bringing SDinoff
inventions to non-contractors, must often deal only with left-
over inventions. Essentially, the JFK policy allows various
government agencies to continue the patent policies to which
they are already accustomed. While this is an incremental
and politically safe approach, it does not bring us any closer
to effective technology transfer.
Section 305 and the JFK policy supply the legal frame-
work for current patent policy) the George Washington Univer-
sity report indicates the results of that policy. Unfortu-
nately, the results are rather discouraging. The GWU report
cites a rather dismal record of invention disclosure and
usage. The conclusions that the GWU authors draw from their
statistics are open to debate, however. They take a pro-
contractor stand right from the start of their report, which
could lead one to question their objectivity. The justifi-
cation for the license policy stand which the GWU authors
cite is this: NASA patents have shown themselves to be of
such little value that the incentive of an exclusive patent
right is needed before a business will take on development
of a spinoff invention. It is interesting to note the GWU
authors' narrowness of focus - they only rarely touch upon
*4
substantive questions such as the government's equity in
spinoff technology or the discrimination against non-con-
tractors. The arbitrariness of the GWU authors is evident
in their rejection of the idea that the taxpayer "pays twice"
for a spinoff invention when purchased from a business hold-
ing monopoly rights to it. The taxpayers do not pay twice
because, say the GWU authors, spinoff is only a by-product
of research and the government's property rights extend
only to products anticipated in the contract. How far the
government's property rights extend in research it is fund-
ing is, of course, the crux of the whole patent policy con-
troversy. Yet the GWU authors state their opinion seemingly
as if it were an established fact.
One does not necessarily have to draw the conclusion
from the apparent paucity of space research spinoff that a
license policy is called for. The GWU authors rely heavily
on information supplied by aero-space contractors, who, the
authors admit, may not always make the fullest accounting
of spinoff. The lack of technological fruitfulness of space
research on which the GWU authors base their license policy
advocacy is really a matter for debate. To focus merely on
that technology which happens to be patentable probably eives
a misleading picture of the value of technological spinoff.
A well functioning technology disclosure program, plus
a potent technology promotion program are prerequisites for
effective technology transfer. Yet as the GWU report indicates,
*5
present efforts in these areas are having difficulties.
The disclosure program in particular seems to be founder-
ing, with fewer new technology disclosures coming out of
space research than the average for all types of government
science research. The solution for the disclosure difficul-
ties offered by the GW1J authors would only reinforce the
already advantageous position of the contractors in govern-
ment science: the GWU authors suggest that the contractors
need an "incentive" such as patent rights for them to faith-
fully report to NASA all new technology arising from contrac-
ted research. This pro-contractor argument is revealing in
that it implies that the contractors are in a position to
willfully hold back disclosures of new technology if they
wish. Even if a failure to disclose new technology results
purely from oversight, the fact still remains that the pre-
sent disclosure system is highly dependent on the vigilance
and honesty of the contractors. It could be argued that
such a critical link in technology transfer should not be
left to parties who naturally would prefer to hang onto as
much spinoff as they could.
A basic assumption of the GWU report seems to be that
contractors are the best candidates for developing spinoff
technology, but information in the Harbridge House report
tends to refute this. The Harbridge House report noted that
government contractors acquire patents to government spon-
sored inventions for such diverse reasons as: to get
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recognition of a company’s technical competence, to use pat-
ents as barter in acquiring licenses from other companies,
and to retain patent rights in order to insure design flexi-
bility. Out of six categories of government contractors
granted patent rights, the Harbridge House report said that
two categories were made up of contractors (some of them among
the government’s largest) who were simply not patent sensitive,
une category was only mildly interested in marketing govern-
ment-sponsored inventions. Another contained companies whose
interest was fragmented unevenly among various internal div-
isions (of the company) • And the final two categories were
very patent sensitive, tending to take on government contracts
in order to acquire spinoff inventions, but only one of these
categories constituted a likely marketing source, the other
does mostly basic research. 2 Thus a contractor oriented
technology transfer system is not necessarily very efficient.
It is clear that if improvements are to be made in this sit-
uation, some basic changes need to be made to remove contrac-
tor predominance.
NASA's Office of Technology Utilization (OTU) promotes
space research spinoff. The main drawback of OTU’s technology
-^-Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study,
Vol . I, Part III, p. Ik-IT.
2 Ibid . , pp. 14-20.
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promotion system seems to be that it cannot fully vault the
gulf between those who carry on research and those who oos-
sibly could utilize spinoff from that research. To state
the problem another way, the OTU’s activities do not close
the gap between the public and private sectors, which seems
to be a prerequisite for effective technology transfer. This
is an ironic state of affairs considering the close ties be-
tween NASA and its contractors, but of course, these contrac-
tors constitute only one part of the private sector. The
OTU programs are a recognition of the fact that the conven-
tional one-to-one relationship between the government and
its contractors must be altered to permit the involvement
of third parties (such as non-contractor businesses) if
technology transfer is to be effective. But at present such
involvement is rather secondhand, with NASA evaluating con-
tractor technology disclosures and relaying the information
on to interested businesses. A working familiarity with a
certain line of technology seems to be a necessity for rec-
ognizing fully its possible applications, yet such famil-
iarity is at present pretty much reserved to contractors.
NASA contractors can capitalize quickly on a license to one
of their government-sponsored inventions, because it comes
to them automatically; non-contractors have no such built-
in competitive advantage. What seems to be needed is a
technology promotion system which would allow interested
parties to examine the work of the contractors while the
work is proceeding, rather than after its completion. This
would, of course, upset to a degree the contractor’s natural
advantages in controlling spinoff, but it is hopefully evi-
dent at this point that such advantages are unfair and not
in the best interests of technology transfer.
The Denver Research Institute report presents perhaos
the firmest evidence that a new system for dealing with tech-
nological spinoff is needed. One of its clearest messages
is that patentable inventions play only a small part in the
overall technology transfer process. The kinds of contri-
butions to science which the report says are made by space
research are of a type that are hard to quantify or isolate
into legally claimable pieces, yet they are economically
and scientifically significant. The present NASA patent
policies seem based on the premise that space technology
spinoff can be somehow packaged and channeled either through
its patent branch or through the OTU, which spends a large
amount of its time promoting non-exclusive licenses to NASA-
held patents. It is this heavy reliance on the natent sys-
tem as a technology transfer device which may be preventing
space research from contributing fully to the nation's eco-
nomic and scientific wealth. In any case, until an effic-
ient technology transfer system is a reality, it will be
extremely difficult for science policy makers to decide
whether space research is or is not a fruitful investment.
The basic idea of a Research Association is that
government and private industry cooperate in carrying on
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scientific research with each side making a contribution
to the operation of the Association. The kind of govern-
ment-industry cooperation in space research which we now
have is unplanned, lacks conscious design, and tends to
force the government to carry most of the financial risk.
In short, it is an offspring of what Theodore Lowi calls
"interest group liberalism." A program aimed at bringing
the benefits of space research to the widest possible range
of potential utilizers would require that the contractor’s
natural familiarity with technological spinoff be shared
with non- contract ors . Accordingly, a Research Association
aimed at developing uses for spinoff technology would be
made up of parties who would have the right to look in on
relevant contractor projects while still in progress. Need-
less to say, space technology developed at government ex-
pense would not be considered the exclusive property of
any private party; this is essential if Association members
are to use spinoff. The Research association could not
only bring information concerning space technology to
potential users, but also carry on post-contract research
and development. Such a program need not be limited to
space research; it could be applicable to government sci-
ence as a whole, and thus serve to break down power rela-
tionships between certain agencies and their "clientele."
A spinoff oriented Research Association would serve to
bring government-industry cooperation out into the open
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and subject it to forms and standards. It is clear that
our present system of government science stands in need
of basic and comprehensive changes if it is to achieve
maximum effectiveness, and if it is not to degenerate into
a system of special privilege and private power.
Theodore Lowi in his book The End of Liberalism ar-
gues that a primary characteristic of what he calls inter-
est group liberalism is the devaluation of law. Such a
devaluation certainly seems to have occurred in the realm
of NASA’s patent policy, with its vagueness, inconsistency,
and its violation of the clearly precedented legal prin-
ciple that the funders of research have property rights
in inventions arising therefrom. Lowi is strongly attrac-
ted to a return to law and democratic forms as a solution
to the interest group fragmentation of public policy. The
Research Association described above would, of course, sub-
ject agencies and businesses to laws that are more substan-
tive and comprehensive than are the ones applied now, but
they would probably be only part of the solution. In the
area of technology transfer, efforts to apDly legal stan-
dards too extensively may result in laws that are ineffec-
tive because of the unpredictable and elusive nature of
research. In this area comprehensivist controls may not
be fully applicable.
Grant McConnell in Private Power and American Demo -
cracy tends to put more emphasis than Theodore Lowi on
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the power of interest groups. The mere presence of regu-
lations does not necessarily change the outcome of inter-
est group desires concerning patent rights, as the JFK
Patent Policy Memorandum shows. The real culprit in the
patent policy field is invisibility. McConnell argues that
the natural tendency of interest groups is to limit consti-
tuency; the concentration of spinoff in the hands of con-
tractors is an example of this - it is a limitation of
government science’s "constituency.” Lowi quite openly
acknowledges that his arguments against interest group
liberalism are on a theoretical plane: he seeks to under-
mine its support among thinking people "in the hopes that
a change of theory can have some small impact on history. "3
But the problem of interest group influence is more than
a clash of theory. It will probably be in the political
arena that interest group power will be tamed, although
this is not to say that the Supreme Court, as Lowi Des-
cribes, cannot make a major contribution. The Court could
uphold challenges made by non-contractors against contrac-
tor-held space program patents, for example. A program
designed to maximize the potential of spinoff from govern-
ment funded research cannot be established by the Court,
however. This is the responsibility of the Congress and
^Lowi, End of Liberalism , p. 29L.
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the Executive branch. If these bodies can somehow be made
to recognize the inconsistent and opportunistic nature of
interest group generated policy in many areas, then consti-
tuency will automatically broaden, and sound public oolicy
should be easier to bring about.
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